Two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values. This paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable, three types of inefficiencies can arise. If the information cost is in an intermediate range, no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information. If the information cost is low, any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition. If the agents face asymmetric information cost the Akerlof's lemons problem arises as a self-fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs.
Introduction
Agents trading financial assets might face significant common values uncertainty because of the uncertain underlying cash flow stream. In particular, in secondary markets the seller of a financial asset must not necessarily posses better information about the value of the asset than a potential buyer but both agents can spend resources to obtain information. This paper analyzes double auction with endogenous information acquisition in such an environment. A buyer and a seller seek to agree on a price at which to trade an asset whose true value is unknown to both parties ex ante. The common value component (quality) of the asset can be either high or low. It is common knowledge that for both realizations the buyer's private valuation for the asset is higher than the seller's private valuation by a fixed margin. Prior to the auction stage the agents can acquire information about the true quality.
Given that there are always gains form trade and that acquiring information is costly, any socially efficient outcome must have trade taking place with probability one and without either party acquiring information irrespective of how the surplus is divided. This paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable endogenous information can cause three types of inefficiencies in double auction. No pure strategy equilibrium with efficient trade may exist. Any full trading equilibria may exhibit costly information acquisition by both agents. The Akerlof's lemons problem may arise as a self-fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs. The intuition for these observations is the following.
To get started, does the trading at the expected quality and the equal-split outcome constitute an equilibrium? Suppose the buyer acquires information and speculates. If the quality of the asset is low the informed buyer submits a low bid and no trade occurs. If the quality is high trade occurs and the seller suffers an endogenous lemons problem while the buyer makes some speculative profits. However, speculation causes an opportunity cost in the sense that the buyer forgoes some surplus in the low state. The seller faces an analogous incentive problem. So the more surplus the buyer is to obtain the higher the buyer's opportunity cost of speculation but the lower the seller's opportunity cost of speculation.
The following cases can arise. (1) If the information cost equals the speculative profit net the maximum of the opportunity cost of speculation of both agents then the equal-split trading equilibrium is the unique efficient equilibrium. Denote c min as this critical (minimum allowable) level of the information cost. (2) If the information cost is smaller than c min but larger than the trading surplus, no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists. In the no trade equilibrium no agent acquires too expensive and non-exploitable information. Because of the endogenous lemons problem the buyer submits a low offer and the seller submits a high offer.
In equilibrium there is symmetric information and yet no trade occurs. This result is different from Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) since the trading gain is common knowledge. It is also different from Akerlof (1970) and Gresik (1991) since there is no asymmetric information about the common value component of the asset.
(3) If the information cost is lower than c min as well as the trading surplus, any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition. It is the desire of the agents to transact on one hand and their concerns about making bad deals due to endogenous lemons problems on the other hand, that induce both the buyer and the seller to acquire information. This observation is related to Matthews (1984) and Hausch and Li (1993) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 shows that if information acquisition is not observable the set of efficient equilibria depends on the information cost and three types of inefficiencies can arise. Section 4 shows that if information acquisition is observable endogenous information has no adverse consequences for efficient trade. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs and Appendix B extends the basic model to the case where the quality of the asset is a continuous random variable and the agents can acquire n∈N units of information.
The Model
A risk neutral buyer and a risk neutral seller seek to agree on a price p at which to trade an asset. The asset is worth v+∆ to the buyer and v−∆ to the seller where v is the uncertain common value component (quality) of the asset and ∆>0 is the private value component (idiosyncratic taste parameter). If the agents agree on a price the trading surplus 2∆ is realized and U B =v+∆−p and U S =p−(v−∆). If no trade occurs the payoff is normalized to zero. 
the efficient k-sharing outcome does not constitute an equilibrium. Analogously, if 
An Information Acquisition Dilemma
This section shows that endogenous information can cause an information acquisition dilemma. If the information cost of both agents is low the desire of the agents to transact on one hand and their concerns about making bad deals due to endogenous lemons problems on the other hand induce both agents to acquire information in any full trade equilibrium. If only one agent faces low information cost, the Akerlof's lemons problem arises as a self-fulfilling equilibrium and no full trade equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable and k∈ [−∆, ∆] . If c≤∆−|k|, then a full trade k-sharing Nash equilibrium exists. In any full trade equilibrium both agents acquire information and EU B =∆−k−c and EU S =∆+k−c.
This observation is related to Matthews (1984) and Hausch and Li (1993) who analyze information acquisition in common values auctions. They show that the bidders acquire excessive information. The key difference between this bargaining model and most auction models (see also Milgrom (1981) and Persico (2000)) is that their auctioneer (seller) is nonstrategic and ignores the lemons problem. 1 Bergemann and Valimäki (2002) employ a mechanism design approach and show that any ex post efficient allocation mechanism causes an ex ante information acquisition inefficiency. However, they point out that their Theorem 2 is a local result and state (p.1027) "In particular, the theorem is not a statement about the (Nash) equilibrium decisions of agents." In this model u B (⋅) and u S (⋅) are in some sense supermodular in v. In equilibrium the agents acquire too much information although their local prediction is that the agents acquire too little information relative to the social optimum.
Proposition 3
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable and k∈ (19829 analyze information acquisition in a principal-agent setting where the agent can acquire information about his disutility of production before signing a contract. They show that in equilibrium no information may be acquired although the information cost is very low. Reny and Perry (2003) analyze large double auction with strategic buyers and strategic sellers but information is exogenous.
A No-Efficient Trade Result
This section establishes the main result of the paper and shows that no pure strategy equilibrium in double auction may exist in which two identically informed agents agree on how to divide a surplus. It is not only actual asymmetric information but potential information asymmetry due to endogenous information acquisition can already render efficient trade unattractive.
Proposition 4
Suppose that information acquisition is not observable. If ∆<c<(v H −v L )/4−0.5∆ then no pure strategy Nash equilibrium with trade exists.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is the following. Since c>∆ no equilibrium exists in which both agents acquire information. Suppose only one agent acquires information. Because of the lemons problem trade occurs with probability 0.5. Although the informed agent is to get full surplus his expected payoff is EU=∆−c<0. Therefore, in any equilibrium no agent acquires too expensive and non-exploitable information. However, since information cost is smaller than the speculative profit net the maximum of opportunity cost of speculation, an uninformed agent is concerned about the endogenous lemons problem. The buyer submits a low offer and the seller submits a high offer. There is symmetric information and yet no trade occurs.
The reason for this inefficiency result is different from Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) . Their result is driven by the assumption that trading gain is not common knowledge. In this setting the gain from trade is common knowledge. There is also a difference between this observation and Akerlof (1970), Samuelson (1985) or Gresik (1991) who assume that one agent is better informed about the common valuation than the other agent. In this setting it is common knowledge that both agents have identical prior information about the common valuation. The threat of potential lemons problems due to endogenous information acquisition is the cause for the inefficiency.
Note, if the agents play mixed strategies (over information acquisition), the no efficient trade result may be mitigated in the sense that trade may occur with positive probability.
Equilibira When Information Acquisition Is Observable
This section shows that if information acquisition is observable by the other agent at the auction stage endogenous information has no adverse consequences in the sense that any efficient outcome satisfying individual rationality is attainable as an equilibrium.
Proposition 5
Suppose that information acquisition is observable and k∈[−∆, ∆]. Any efficient k-sharing outcome is attainable as a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium irrespective of information cost.
Since information acquisition is observable at the bargaining stage, an agent can also condition his offer strategy on the fact whether the other agent is better informed or not.
Suppose ex ante the agents agree to trade at E[v] but the buyer acquires information and tries to exploit the seller. At the bargaining stage it is common knowledge that the buyer is better informed. So the seller does not submit the offer E[v] anymore. In order to account for the lemons problem the seller submits a high offer. Since the buyer anticipates the lemons problem he himself creates by acquiring information, his best response is not to acquire information. So no agent has an incentive to acquire more information than the counter party.
However, if information acquisition is not observable, the agents cannot target their offer strategies appropriately and are concerned about the endogenous lemons problem. number of agents with real trading motives (liquidity traders). Dang (2005a) shows that if the liquidity traders behave strategically they themselves acquire information. In particular, the large liquidity traders are the ones who determine equilibrium prices. Furthermore, strategic liquidity trading constitutes one channel which breaks the inverse relationship between informationally efficient prices and the compensation for information cost since the trading surplus is fixed. This provides a counterexample to the impossibility result in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . (3) The basic model can be used as an ingredient to discuss financial contracting in delegated portfolio management in which the liquidity traders hire portfolio managers to trade on behalf of them. In such a setting an optimal contract between investor A and manager A may also have to take into account the strategic effect on the contract between investor B and manager B and vice versa so that portfolio net returns may be endogenous.
Proof of Proposition 2
Claim It is easy to see that the min{r,−t} in (1) is non-decreasing in r and −t. Therefore, one should start with r=∆ and t=−∆. Then 
Proof of Proposition 3
Since the proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 it is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4
Corollary 1 (b) shows that if c<(v H −v L )/4−0.5∆, no equilibrium exists in which no agent acquires information and full trade occurs. It is easy to see that since c>∆, there exists no equilibrium in which both agents acquire information. Two things remain to be shown. 
constitute best responses (and a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium).
Step 1 (Best responses at the bargaining stage) Step 2 
Formally, the information filter has the following structure (see also Figure A ): 
Proposition A
Suppose that information acquisition is unobservable, C(n)=nc, and ∆<(v H −v L )/2 N where N is some integer. Define n*=max{0,η} where
If n*≥1, c≤(1−0.5 n* )∆/n*, and n*≤N−2, then in a symmetric full trade equal-spilt equilibrium the agents choose n B =n S =n* and b=s=E [vI(n*,v) ] and EU B =EU S =∆−C(n*).
Proof of Proposition A
The information acquisition equilibrium is proven by construction.
Suppose n B =n S =n. If v∈I j (v) for j=1,….,
If the buyer and the seller choose n B =n S =n and play the following symmetric offer strategy b=s=E [vI(n,v) ] then EU B =EU S =∆−C(n). Suppose the buyer deviates to n B =n+1. His information advantage is illustrated in Figure B . 
In other words, if v∈I 
The ex ante expected speculative profit is π=(v H −v L )/2 3+n and the opportunity cost of speculation is 0.5∆ (at the equal-split agreement). 
Due to the integer constraint, n is to round down to the next smallest integer denoted with η.
For n B =n S =η≥1 and b=s=E [vI(η,v) ] being an equilibrium, one has to show that acquiring less information than η is not a profitable deviation. 
